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The key analytical and policy question examined in this paper is whether 
multinational companies and their overseas investment need to be regulated at 
the national or the international level, in order to address market failures, and to 
enhance their potential contribution to world welfare. The paper examines two 
kinds of regulatory regimes: first the current regime and second, a new regime 
proposed by the European community and Japan at the WTO (ECJ) to institute 
fresh global rules of the game which will effectively allow multinationals 
unfettered freedom to invest where they like, whenever they like, how much and 
in what products. 
 
Very briefly, the central conclusion of the paper is that ECJ, despite its 
important concession of confining itself to only one source of external finance 
namely FDI, is a flawed proposal both from the perspective of developing and 
developed countries. Its shortcomings are particularly serious with respect to 
developing countries as it essentially ignores the developmental dimension 
altogether. It is emphasized that although the current post-Uruguay Round FDI 
regime is to be preferred in relation to the ECJ, the former has, nevertheless 
severe deficits from a developmental perspective. These need prompt action by 
the international community. 
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I   Introduction 
 
This paper selectively reviews the role of FDI in the present state of the world 
economy - how it affects economic development and well being in rich and poor 
countries. Multinational companies are normally the vehicles for FDI and are 
central to the current globalisation processes. The key analytical and policy 
question examined in the paper is whether these companies and their overseas 
investment need to be regulated at the national or the international level, in order 
to address market failures, as well as to otherwise enhance their potential 
contribution to world welfare. The paper will start by examining two kinds of 
regulatory regimes: first the current regime and second, a new regime proposed 
by the European community and Japan at the WTO to institute fresh global rules 
of the game which will effectively allow multinationals unfettered freedom to 
invest where they like, whenever they like, how much and in what products. 
Such a regime has been proposed by the aforementioned countries at the 
Working Group on Trade and Investment at the WTO. Although after the failure 
of the WTO ministerial meeting in September 2003 at Cancun, the discussion of 
the so-called Singapore issues (which include investment) has been suspended, 
the proposal of the European community and Japan is still on the table and will 
sooner or later be taken up again, perhaps as early as the next WTO ministerial 
meeting in Hong Kong, 2005. It is argued here, that this proposal is neither in 
the interests of developing countries nor that of most people in the advanced 
countries. Rather it represents sectional interest in advanced economies.
2 The 
main burden of the paper will be to argue that the proposed EEC-Japan 
(hereafter called the ECJ) regime for regulating FDI by multinational 
corporations is sub-optimal for both rich and poor countries. The paper will 
outline an alternative inclusive regime, which will be more compatible with 
world welfare than the ECJ proposal.  
 
The main concentration of this paper is therefore on the regulation or control of 
FDI in order for it to help maximise long-term productivity growth in 
developing economies. Restriction on capital flows is a controversial subject 
with an enormous literature.
3 Many economists now accept that in the 
circumstances of developing countries, controls on short-term capital flows such 
as international portfolio flows are justified. Indeed, Stiglitz (2000, 2004), takes 
the IMF to task for advocating capital account liberalization to developing 
countries before the Asian crisis. He suggests that the case for such 
liberalization is not supported either by sound economic theory or by empirical 
studies. In view of the particular structural features of developing economies, he 
favours capital controls on short-term flows in many instances. Stiglitz is very 
critical of the IMF for its ideological blindness, which made it eschew capital 





As for FDI, Stiglitz (2000) makes it clear that his strictures against the IMF for 
not recommending controls on short-term flows to developing countries apply 
much less to the case of FDI. However, in his 2004 paper he takes a more 
sceptical view, even of FDI, and suggests reasons why the latter may not benefit 
developing countries (DCs). This paper will go further and suggest that there are 
powerful arguments for appropriate regulation of FDI at both the national and 
international levels, so as to ensure the benefit for the DCs.  
 
It is important to note that apart from the DC governments and the 
multinationals, there is increasingly a significant third player in this arena, 
namely the workers in advanced countries. Many employees and trade unionists 
in advanced countries (ACs) regard multinational investment in DCs as a major 
cause of their own severe labour market deficits – high unemployment, de-
industrialisation and wage dispersion. This claim is supported by populist 
politics as well as some serious economists (see for example Wood 1994; 
Bluestone and Harrison 1982). A significant issue referred to in this paper, albeit 
briefly for reasons of space, is whether there is a regulatory framework for 
multinationals which can both protect the developmental interests of poor 
countries and help towards removing the labour market deficiencies in advanced 
countries.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first part of the paper outlines the 
relevant stylised facts about multinational investment and provides an analytical 
description of the current regulatory regime as well as the ECJ’s proposed new 
order. In the second part, the implications of these regimes are examined for 
various aspects of economic development, including economic growth and 
stability, policy autonomy, transfer of technology. In view of its importance and 
for the sake of completeness, the next part sketches out the implications of 
currents trends in multinational investment for workers in advanced countries 
and outlines how outcomes can be improved by appropriate regulation. The last 
part of the paper sums up the argument and provides a developmental audit of 
alternative regulatory regimes.  
 
 
II Stylized  Facts  Concerning Multinationals and FDI  
 
There have been enormous changes in the amounts and the pattern of capital 
flows from   industrial countries to emerging economies in the 1980s and the 
1990s compared with the1960s and 1970s. At the same time, there has also been 
a sea-change in developing countries' perspective on, and attitude towards, FDI. 




multinational investment and sought to control multinational companies' 
activities through domestic and international regulations. However, during the 
last two decades emerging countries have been falling over themselves to attract 
as much multinational investment as they can. It will be suggested below that 
this enormous shift in developing countries’ stance toward multinational 
investment is closely related to the changes in the pattern of capital flows. The 
former is both the cause and the consequence of the latter. It will further be 
argued that developing countries find the new profile of international capital 
flows profoundly unsatisfactory from a developmental perspective. 
 
The most important characteristics of international capital flows to developing 
countries during the last two decades include the following. (The relevant tables 
are given in the Appendix.) 
   
  There has been an enormous increase in financial resource flows to 
developing countries during the last three decades as the world economy 
has liberalised and become financially more integrated. World Bank 
figures indicate that net resource flows to all developing countries rose 
from a mere US $11billions or so in 1970 to more than US $80b in 
1980 and to just over US $100 billions in 1990. 
  
  Net resources flows to developing countries recorded a quantum leap 
between 1990 and 1995, rising to nearly US $240 billions in the latter 
year. There was a further sharp increase in the next two years until the 
Asian crisis. There have been reduced net resource flows subsequently 
(Appendix Tables 1 and 3; Table 3, which reports only on selective 
inflows and has been constructed on a somewhat different basis than 
Table 1, provides for the most recent period). 
  
  Appendix Table 1 also provides information on the changing sources of 
the external resource flows to developing countries during the last three 
decades. The table suggests that in the 1970s, long-term debt was the 
predominant source of finance. In the 1980s, as a consequence of the debt 
crisis, this source became relatively less important compared with before 
and the significance of FDI, as well as that of government grants, rose. In 
the 1990s FDI has emerged as a predominant source of external finance 
for developing countries. As Table 3 indicates, in 2001, net FDI inflows 
into developing countries was several orders of magnitude larger than 
either net portfolio flows or net debt flows. 
  
  The IMF data reported in Table 2 in the Appendix enables us to 




which emerges from this table is that most of the increase in capital flows 
to developing countries in the 1990s has been due to private rather than 
official flows. Between 1990 and 1996 private flows were on average 
nearly 8 times as large as official flows. 
  
  Appendix Table 4 reports data from the World Bank on developing 
countries’ shares in global FDI, in capital market flows, and, for a 
comparative perspective, it also reports these countries’ share in global 
output and international trade for each of the years from 1991 to 2000. 
The table indicates that developing country shares both in global FDI and 
capital market flows have become much smaller since the Asian crisis. 
However, these countries’ shares in global output and trade in the 
corresponding period have not declined but remained much the same. 
  
  Inward FDI flows accounted on average for 5% of advanced countries 
gross fixed capital formation during the late 1980s and for most of the 
1990s. However, there was a sharp increase in this share in 1998: inward 
FDI's contribution in these countries rose from 6.2% in 1997 to10.9 % in 
1998. For developing countries inward FDI, during the 1990s was 
relatively more important in relation to the gross fixed capital formation 
than for developed countries (See Table 5 in Appendix).  
  
  FDI flows to developing countries are highly concentrated. Ten countries 
accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total FDI inflows in 2000 
(World Bank 2001, page 38).  
 
This pattern of capital flows, including that of FDI, has important substantive 
implications for developing countries. As noted above, the decline of grants and 
other official flows has meant that private capital, particularly in the form of 
FDI, has become a major source of external finance for these countries. At the 
same time, analysis and evidence suggest that developing countries' need for 
external finance has greatly increased. This is in part due to the liberalisation of 
trade and capital flows in the international economy. UNCTAD (2000) suggests 
that, because of these structural factors, developing countries have become more 
balance-of-payments constrained than before: the constraint begins to bite at a 
much slower growth rate than was the case previously in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In these circumstances it is not surprising that developing countries have 
radically changed their attitude towards FDI. There has also, therefore, been 





Apart from this important role of FDI as a main source of external finance for 
DCs, its traditional task on the real side of the economy continues to be 
important. It is one of the main sources of technological development and 
technology transfer to DCs. To minimize their cause and to compete more 
efficiently in the international economy, many multinational companies have 
“fragmented” production between countries and formed international supply 
chains. Multinational  companies also engaged in fragmentation of the 
production and the formation of international supply chain (Milberg, 2003). 
These issues and this implication for a multilateral investment regime will be 
taken up below. 
 
III   The Current Investment Regime 
 
The current post-WTO investment regime is shaped by Uruguay Round 
Agreements. The hallmark of the Uruguay Round Agreements (which 
established the WTO) has been that apart from trade liberalization, these 
agreements have also extended  multilateral rules and disciplines to a number of 
policy areas affecting industrial development and competitiveness with regard to 
both goods and services.  Such policies -- generally defined as industrial policies 
-- have been extensively used for the last three decades notably by fast growing 
countries in the East Asia to foster exports and to achieve rapid structural change 
and economic growth.   However, the following agreements have restricted such 
industrial and export promotion policies: 
 
  -Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; 
  -Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); 
  -Understanding on Balance of Payments; 
-Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs); 
  -General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
  -Decisions on Measures in Favour of Least Developed Countries; 
  -Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
In order to see how these provisions affect the policy space of DCs, it may be 
useful to carry out a mental exercise by asking the question, which of the 
industrial and export promotion policies undertaken by Japan and Korea during 
their industrialization drive would  have been impermissible had the Uruguay 
Round Agreements been in force then.  It will be useful to recall the  
during the periods of rapid economic growth -- Japan between 1950 -1973 and 





1.   Export Promotion Policies 
  import restrictions, both general and specific; 
  favouring particularly sectors for export promotion and in some cases 
particular firms for that purpose; 
  seeking compliance for subsidies given to exporters by means of export 
targets for specific firms (the Korean case);  
  interest rate subsidies and the availability of credit and foreign exchange to 
favoured firms that met export targets; 
  general export promotion, in Japan through JETRO (Japanese external 
trade organization) and in Korea via KWOTRO; 
  provision of infrastructure including human capital;  
  taxation relief on imported inputs and on R&D expenditures;  
  allowing favoured conglomerates to import capital goods and foreign 
technology and to raise cheaper finance on international markets; 
 
2.   Industrial Policy Measures 
 
a) lax enforcement of competition policy, including the extensive use of 
cartels.
4 
b)  government creation and promotion of conglomerates in Korea;
5 
c)  tax concessions to corporations to increase investment; 
d) promotion of a close, long term relationship between finance and industry 
which was critical to the implementation of the industrial policy
6; 
e) labour repression to ensure labour peace in a period of gigantic structural 
change (this applies to Korea rather than to Japan)
7; 
f) establishment of state industries to enhance industrial development (this 
again applies to Korea rather than to Japan); 
g)  administrative guidance used extensively both in Japan and Korea. 
 
Which of these policies would have fallen foul of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements had these been in operation at the time? The short answer is that had 
Japan and Korea implemented these policies in the post-Uruguay Round period a 
good number of those in section I - though not all - would not have been 
permitted.  Most of those in section 1 would have been allowed, provided they 
had been skilfully operated.  The two countries would have had to tailor their 
interventions to be compatible with the new trading rules.  Specifically, these 
rules allow subsidies for technological development, as long as they are 
non-specific.  Other subsidies would have needed to have been given in the form 
of regional aid; or to small and medium enterprises.  However, Japan and Korea 
would not have been able to provide generalized protection of the kind they 





Thus, the current trading and investment regime for multinational corporations 
has important drawbacks for DCs in that it forecloses important policy options 
which the highly successful East Asian economies used during their economic 
development.  
 
IV  Proposed ECJ Regulatory Regime 
 
Although the full details of the proposed ECJ regulatory scheme are not yet 
available, it will certainly go further in restricting the DC policy options than the 
current WTO provisions outlined above. The purpose of the proposed ECJ regime 
would appear to be to establish an agreement on investment similar to that which 
the OECD failed to conclude five years ago – the so called multilateral agreement 
on investment (MAI). This suggests, as noted by Singh and Zammit (1999) that 
the ECJ proposal would involve the following kind of elements.  
 
  the right of establishment for foreign investors; 
  the principles of 'most-favoured nation' (mfn) treatment; 
  the principle of 'national treatment'; 
  investment protection, including matters relating to expropriation and the 
transfer of capital; 
  additional disciplines relating to, among other matters, entry, stay, and 
work of key personnel; 
  abolition of performance requirements imposed by host governments on 
foreign investors in order to secure economic benefits for the country as a 
whole; 
  multilateral rules on investment incentives; and 
  binding rules for settling disputes. 
 
Thus, ECJ will be a regime with high standards of investor protections and 
strong disciplines against restrictions on the free flow of FDI activity, among 
WTO member countries. The Unites States agrees with the need for a treaty with 
high standards, but is sceptical whether this is possible within the WTO. In view 
of the almost universal membership of the WTO and its consensus rules of 
procedure, the US feels that it would only be possible to negotiate there a 
multilateral agreement with low standards. Nevertheless, the US does not 
oppose discussions and negotiations on the subject at the WTO, if member 
countries wish to pursue these. 
 
The original MAI was all embracing in its definition of investment. As the 
OECD (1997) noted, the scope of the proposed Treaty went "beyond the 
traditional notion of FDI to cover virtually all tangible and intangible assets 




abandoned OECD agreement therefore included, among other things, 
intellectual property as well as portfolio investment. 
 
The present motivation of advanced countries for confining their proposed MAI 
type agreement at the WTO to just foreign direct investment is not difficult to 
surmise. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, it has been widely recognised that 
the volatility of short-term capital flows often leads to serious economic and 
financial problems for developing countries. There is therefore an emerging 
consensus that it may be prudent for the governments of these countries to 
restrict such flows. 
 
Advanced countries are, therefore, wise to lower their sights and exclude short-
term and other controversial capital flows from the purview of the ECJ, and seek 
agreement only on FDI. It is widely believed on the basis of the experience of 
the debt crisis in the 1980s and the subsequent Mexican, Asian and other crises 
in the 1990s that, compared with debt and portfolio investment, FDI, apart from 
its other merits, is the safest source of funds for developing countries. It is 
thought to neither add to a country's debt, nor (being bricks and mortar) can it be 
quickly withdrawn from the country. The proponents therefore expect that an 
MAI, concerned only with FDI, would be much more acceptable to developing 
countries. This issue, however, is more complicated than might appear at first 
sight, and will therefore be discussed more fully below. 
 
V  FDI as a Major Source of External Finance 
 
As indicated above, an important characteristic of FDI today is that it has 
become a prominent source of external finance for developing countries. 
Leaving aside other characteristics of FDI (to be discussed later), we shall 
consider it here first simply as a source of finance, and examine its implications 
for the balance-of-payments and for macroeconomic management of the 
economy. In orthodox analyses, FDI, apart from all the other supposed 
advantages, is regarded as a stable source of finance (UNCTAD 1999; Lipsey 
1999). In contrast to portfolio investments, FDI by definition is supposed to 
reflect a long term commitment as it involves normally a stake of 10% or more 
in a host country enterprise, together with managerial control.
8 In view of the 
latter element, the presumption is that the inflow of foreign capital in this form 
will be more stable than portfolio investments. The latter are easier to liquidate 
and following an internal or external shock, investors may quickly withdraw 





There are, however, important arguments to suggest that the presumption of 
stability in net FDI inflows may not be correct. First, the distinction between 
FDI and portfolio investment has become very much weaker with the growth of 
derivatives and hedge funds. As Claessens et al., (1993) observe in their World 
Bank study, even at a more elementary level it is easy to see how a long-term 
"bricks and mortar" investment can be converted into a readily liquid asset: 
"Because direct investors hold factories and other assets that are impossible to 
move, it is sometimes assumed that a direct investment inflow is more stable 
than other forms of capital flows. This need not be the case. While a direct 
investor usually has some immovable assets, there is no reason in principle why 
these cannot be fully offset by domestic liabilities. Clearly a direct investor can 
borrow in order to export capital, and thereby generate rapid capital outflows." 
Another reason why FDI may be volatile is because a large part of a country's 
measured FDI according to the IMF balance-of-payment conventions usually 
consists of retained profits. As profits are affected by the business cycle, they 
display considerable volatility. This also prevents FDI from being anti-cyclical 
and stabilising unless the host and home country economic cycles are out of 
phase with each other. That may or may not happen. 
 
Further, there is evidence that, like other sources of finance, FDI flows can also 
at times come in surges. Apart from their contribution to volatility, these FDI 
surges, as those for example of portfolio investment can lead to equally 
undesirable consequences such as exchange rate appreciation and reduced 
competitiveness of a country's tradable sector. 
 
The World Bank paper referred to above came to the conclusion that: "long-term 
flows are often as volatile as short- term flows, and the time it takes for an 
unexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows."
9 However, a more 
recent study (UNCTAD, 1998), found that between 1992 and 1997 FDI was 
relatively more stable than portfolio flows, but there were important exceptions. 
The latter included Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan.  
 
Quite apart from the question of the comparative volatility of FDI and other 
flows, there are other important implications of FDI for a host country's balance 
of- payments. These derive from the fact that an FDI investment creates foreign 
exchange liabilities not only now but also into the future. This characteristic 
leads to the danger that unfettered FDI may create a time profile of foreign 
exchange outflows (in the form of dividend payments or profits repatriation) and 
inflows (e.g., fresh FDI) which may be time inconsistent. Experience shows that 
such incompatibility, even in the short run, may easily produce a liquidity crisis. 
The evidence from the Asian crisis countries with the latter suggests that it could 




economic development.6 Professor Kregal (1996) sums up the balance-of-
payments implications of FDI in the following terms: "…while portfolio flows 
may have a more direct impact on short-term reserve management and exchange 
rate policy, FDI may have both a short and a longer-term structural influence on 
the composition of a country's external payment flows. While financial 
innovation allows FDI to have an impact in the short run which is increasingly 
similar in terms of volatility to portfolio flows, the more important aspect is the 
way it may mask the true position of a country's balance-of-payments and the 
sustainability of any particular combination of policies … accumulated foreign 
claims in the form of accumulated FDI stocks may create a potentially disruptive 
force that can offset any domestic or external policy goals." (Kregal, 1996). 
 
These considerations suggest that, in order to avoid financial fragility which is 
likely to follow from unfettered FDI, the governments would need to monitor 
and regulate the amount and timing of FDI. Since the nature of large FDI 
projects (whether or not for example these would produce exportable products 
or how large their imports would be) can also significantly affect the time 
profile of aggregate foreign exchange inflows and outflows, both in the short 
and long term, the government may also need to regulate such investments. To 
the extent that the ECJ would not permit such regulation of FDI, it would 
subject developing economies to much greater financial fragility than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 
It could in principle be argued that, even if the financial fragility point is 
conceded, an ECJ may still benefit developing countries by generating greater 
overall FDI which could compensate for the increased financial fragility. 
However, this proposition is of doubtful validity. We saw earlier that there has 
been a huge increase in FDI in the 1990s. This occurred without any MAI and 
was clearly a product of a number of other factors.
10 Similarly, there does not 
seem to be any connection between regulatory constraints on FDI and the total 
amount of FDI which a country may be able to attract. Malaysia and China, (see 
Braunstein and Epstein, 1999), to illustrate, are large recipients of FDI despite 
having significant control and regulation over FDI projects.  
 
VI     FDI, Technology Transfer, Spill-over and ECJ 
 
Apart from FDI as a source of finance, two of the most important ways in which 
a DC may benefit from such investments is through (a) transfer of technology 
and (b) from spill overs. The latter refer to the indirect impact of FDI on raising 
productivity in local firms. These firms may be helped by foreign investment in 
a variety of ways, including the demonstration effect of the new technology and 




On the other hand, there may be few positive or even negative spill-overs, if FDI 
leads to local firms being forced out of the market because of greater 
competition. 
 
Both issues of technology transfer and spill-overs have been widely studied and 
there exists on these subjects a large and controversial literature. The main 
lesson which comes from these writings, however, is that a country is more 
likely to benefit from multinational investment if it is integrated into its national 
development and technological plans (see further Dunning, 1994; Freeman, 
1989; Milberg, 1999; South Centre, 2000; etc.) This is the reason why, other 
than Hong Kong, most successful Asian countries (including China and 
Malaysia as seen above), have not allowed unfettered FDI but have extensively 
regulated it. 
 
An interesting recent study by Agosin and Mayer (2000) investigates an 
important aspect of the spill-overs issue by asking the question whether FDI in a 
host country "crowds in" further investment by local firms or "crowds out" 
existing investments of these firms as a consequence of increased competition 
and hence lower profits. The two authors’ research covered the period 1970- 
1996 and included host countries from all three developing regions, Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. The results of the econometric exercise suggest that over 
this long period there was a strong "crowding in" in Asia, "crowding out" in 
Latin America and more or less neutral effects in Africa. Agosin and Mayer 
conclude: 
 
"The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the positive 
impacts of FDI on domestic investment are not assured. In some cases, total 
investment may increase much less than FDI, or may even fail to rise when a 
country experiences an increase in FDI. Therefore, the assumption that 
underpins policy toward FDI in most developing countries - that FDI is always 
good for a country's development and that a liberal policy toward MNEs is 
sufficient to ensure positive effects - fails to be upheld by the data." 
 
They go on to note: "…the most far-reaching liberalizations of FDI regimes in 
the 1990s took place in Latin America, and that FDI regimes in Asia have 
remained the least liberal in the developing world… Nonetheless, it is in these 
countries that there is strongest evidence of CI (crowding in). In Latin America, 
on the other hand, liberalization does not appear to have led to CI." 
 
The policy implications of this analysis of FDI in relation to technology and 




regulate FDI closely in order for it to promote economic development and not to 
hinder it. 
 
A. Market Failures 
 
In broad analytical terms, the case for such government interventions in the FDI 
process lies in various kinds of market failures. Co-ordination problems abound 
in relation to investment, including foreign investment, and in the presence of 
non-existent or incomplete markets typical in a developing economy, 
governments need to intervene to address co-ordination failures. As the 
UNCTAD Secretary General R. Ricupero (1999) observed: "Significant market 
failures characterize the TNC investment process in its relationship to 
developing countries. The first (kind of market failures) arise from information 
or co-ordination failures in the investment process, which can lead a country to 
attract insufficient FDI, or the wrong quality of FDI. The second arises when 
private interests of investors diverge from the economic interests of host 
countries." (p.xxv, parenthesis added) 
 
Milberg (1999) calls attention to another kind of market failure in relation to 
FDI which again calls for government intervention. He observes: "Location 
decisions of firms may deviate from those predicted by comparative advantage 
for a number of reasons. Firms may put national characteristics ahead of relative 
cost considerations. Also, to the extent that heightened capital mobility has 
coincided with growing global excess capacity, trade liberalization may not 
bring the price adjustment necessary to convert a relative productivity advantage 
to an advantage in terms of absolute money costs. When currency values do not 
respond to trade imbalances in the expected fashion, then the price adjustment 
implied by the theory of comparative advantage may also be inoperative." 
 
B. Government Failures 
 
It may be argued that these market failures may turn out to be less important 
than government failures. That is certainly true in some cases, but it must be 
remembered that the developing world also contains a large number of highly 
successful governments, the so-called 'developmental states' in the newly 
industrializing countries (NICs). If developing countries are to attract the right 
kind of FDI, in the right amounts, and to be able to obtain the maximum benefit 
from these, they need to guide the process and therefore must have effective 
states (see further Amsden, 2001). For otherwise, they will not receive sufficient 





VII International  Merger  Movement, FDI and Developing Countries
 
 
The world economy has been undergoing a gigantic merger movement over the 
last decade, probably the largest ever
11. An outstanding characteristic of this 
merger wave is the high incidence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Indeed, such mergers and corporate take-overs are an important 
vehicle for FDI flows between industrial countries. However, cross-border 
merger activity involving developing countries, although quite small by the 
standards of advanced countries, has greatly expanded as well during the last 
three years. (See Table 5 in the Appendix for the sales and purchases of cross-
border M&As for the 1990s.) The data in Table 5 are, however, at an aggregate 
level - for the world as a whole and for the main regions. UNCTAD (1999) 
carried out a more detailed analysis of the incidence of cross-border M&As in 
developing countries. It found that if China (which among developing countries 
has not only been the largest recipient of FDI but most of its investment has also 
been "green field", that is, new) is excluded, the share of M&As in the 
accumulated FDI rises from 22% during 1988 to 1991 on average to 72% in the 
period 1992 to 1997. 
 
This preferred mode of entry of FDI raises troubling questions in relation to its 
costs and benefits for developing countries. It also raises difficult questions for 
ECJ. When FDI takes the form of green field investment, it represents a net 
addition to the host country's capital stock. However, FDI entry via an 
acquisition may not represent any addition at all to the capital stock, output or 
employment. In the medium term there may be more investment by the 
acquiring firm if the acquisition is deemed successful. How beneficial FDI is to 
developing countries in the long term, if it takes predominantly the form of 
cross-border take-overs of domestic firms by foreign corporations, is ultimately 
an empirical question on which there is so far little hard evidence. 
 
Nevertheless, cross-border take-overs raise difficult issues for ECJ. If FDI is 
occurring through take-overs, would the ECJ require that an advanced country 
corporation should be able to purchase any host country corporation on the stock 
market without let or hindrance, (except in relation to firms protected by 
national defense or other similar considerations)? This important issue does not 
appear to have been directly addressed in ECJ. However, going by the analogy 
with the green field investment where essentially the ECJ would permit any 
home country corporation to invest in any activity in a host country (subject to 
the usual caveats), it would follow that a foreign company should be able to 
acquire any domestic company as a form of FDI. From a developing country 
perspective such a procedure would have very negative consequences. There is a 




limited extent on the basis of performance, but largely on the basis of size. 
Research for the U.S. and the U.K. shows that, in the market for corporate 
control, the large, relatively unprofitable companies have a much greater chance 
of survival than the small, profitable ones.10 Thus, under ECJ, if FDI takes the 
form of acquisition of host country corporations on the stock market, the net 
result could be that of the best DC corporations being acquired by the much 
larger multinationals even though the latter would not be as efficient as the 
acquired corporations. 
 
The international merger movement raises another important area of concern for 
DCs. This relates to the question of unequal competition between large 
multinationals and big domestic corporations in these countries. Even the largest 
DC corporations tend to be much smaller than the industrial country 
multinationals. The current large merger wave is likely to make this disparity 
even bigger. By means of these world-wide mergers and tie-ups, the advanced 
country corporations are able to integrate their international operations. This 
may be a source of genuine technical economies of scale, but evidence indicates 
that in most industries average cost curves are L-shaped, that is to say, after a 
threshold size which is relatively small and which most of these giant 
corporations would already have achieved even before mergers, costs do not fall 
as the size of the firm increases. The economies which nevertheless the 
multinationals are able to achieve through integration are those relating to bulk 
buying of inputs, reduced cost of capital. To the extent that these economies 
depend on the market power of the multinationals in relation to inputs, the cost 
saving measures are not necessarily welfare enhancing; furthermore, these 




During the last 50 years, Japan, as well as many NICs in Asia and Latin 
America, were able to foster the development of big businesses to the advantage 
of these countries' overall economic development. This has usually been 
achieved through various kinds of state support. These large domestic 
corporations, which are privately owned, have often been the leaders in the 
diffusion of new technologies and the adaptation of imported technologies to 
domestic circumstances.
13 However, in the current international economic 
environment these firms are likely to be handicapped in three significant ways: 
 
a) through the limiting of state aid as part of WTO disciplines; 
b) through the increased size and market power both in the product and 
input markets of large multinationals; and 
c) through increased barriers to entry and contestability which the last 




boom of the 1990s has created.(Tichy 2001) 
 
It is normal for multinationals to complain that there is no 'level playing field' 
between themselves and national corporations which are government supported; 
hence, the multinationals' demand for "national treatment". However, the actual 
situation is quite the opposite; the playing fields are tilted in favour of 
multinationals who have considerable market power. The current international 
merger movements is making these fields more unequal even from the 
perspective of the large developing country corporations. 
 
The mechanical application of the sacred WTO principle of 'national treatment' 
in the circumstances set out above would clearly lead to perverse results which 
would both harm economic development in developing countries as well as lead 
to global economic inefficiency. The remedy in these circumstances may lie in 
competition authorities in developing countries being exempted from the formal 
or informal application of the doctrine of national treatment.  
 
To provide a simple illustration, it should be perfectly legitimate for a 
developing country competition authority to allow large domestic firms to merge 
so that they can go some way toward competing on more equal terms with 
multinationals from abroad. Even if the amalgamating national firms are on the 
horizontal part of the L-shaped static cost curve, bigger size may still promote 
dynamic efficiency for the reason that firms need to achieve a minimum 
threshold size to finance their own R & D activities. The competition authority 
may therefore quite reasonable deny national treatment to the multinationals and 
prohibit their merger activity (because they are already large enough to achieve 
either static or dynamic economies of scale in this sense). In these 
circumstances, a violation of the doctrine of national treatment is likely to be 
beneficial both to economic development and to competition. 
 
VIII  The Right to Economic Development and ECJ 
 
It may be argued against the analysis and proposals outlined above that these run 
contrary to the cherished WTO 'principles' such as national treatment and market 
access, as well as attempt to reopen agreements already settled such as the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). This is certainly 
one side of the ledger. There is, however, the other side which unfortunately is 
completely ignored by the proponents of ECJ. This concerns the ultimate goals 
of the WTO and their relationship to that organisation's procedural principles 





The Preamble to the WTO notes that "trade and economic endeavour should be 
conducted with a view to raising the standards of living, ensuring full 
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and 
effective demand". It is further stated that "there is need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed 
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate 
with the needs of their economic development". Full employment and economic 
development are not only the ultimate goals of the WTO but these have also 
been repeatedly endorsed by the international community. In 1995, 117 Heads 
of State or Government attending the Copenhagen Social Summit endorsed the 
Copenhagen Declaration, which put primary emphasis on the promotion of full 
employment and poverty reduction. More recently similar declaration have been 
made at the Millennium Summit at the UN and other fora. Indeed, the right to a 
decent living has virtually acquired the status of a universal human right. 
 
If experience and analysis show that the primary goals of WTO are being 
harmed rather than helped by specific measures such as TRIMS, or the equal 
application to all countries of a particular procedural principle such as national 
treatment, it is the latter which should be changed. It is the primary goals rather 
than the procedural principles of an international organization which should 
dominate especially as the former are widely endorsed by the world community 
as a whole. 
 
IX  ECJ, FDI and Advanced Economies 
 
It has been suggested above that unfettered FDI as envisaged in ECJ can lead to 
financial fragility in developing countries and harm their development prospects. 
However, what would be its implications for the citizens of advanced countries?  
It would be useful to discuss these briefly, even if the main focus of this paper is 
on developing countries.  
 
There are good reasons to believe that although there are gains to the 
multinationals and their managers from ECJ as it gives them a license to invest 
anywhere they like, it does not necessarily greatly benefit the citizens of 
advanced countries. With the free mobility of capital provided by ECJ, and 
labour being essentially immobile, the balance of power shifts decisively 
towards capital in these countries. Apart from its unfavourable implications for 
the distribution of income between labour and capital, such a shift may also 
leads to job insecurity and low labour standards. The employers in a high-
waged, high- labour standards countries may simply threaten to take their 
investments to a low- waged, low-labour standard host country. Large 




objectives without actually having to carry out the threat, as long as the threat 
was credible in the first place.  There is a growing analytical and empirical 
literature on this subject which broadly confirms this intuition.
14 
 
More broadly, the footloose FDI is not helpful in establishing harmonious co-
operative relations between labour and capital in advanced economies.   
However, developing countries, by their efforts to control the process of FDI in 
order to increase their gains from it and to reduce losses, also indirectly do 
service to citizens and workers in advanced countries. Essentially, these 
measures amount to throwing the proverbial 'sand in the wheels' of too much 
capital mobility. This probably helps to slightly re-address the balance between 
capital and labour in advanced countries. 
 
In a series of papers this author has suggested that in the present circumstances 
of the world economy, there would be enormous gains for both the North and 
the South from purposeful economic co-operation, as that could lead to faster 
global economic growth. The application of that  analysis to the case of FDI 
would suggest that with its appropriate regulation by both developed and 
developing countries, within a broader framework of other North/South co-
operation policy measures, could greatly increase the net gains from FDI to each 
group of countries. This would however, involve the abandonment of ECJ and 
establishing institutional arrangements for active co-operation between nation 




X  Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties 
 
To attract FDI, developing countries have entered into a large number of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developed as well as other developing 
countries. Ganesan (1998) reports that by January 1997 there were 1,330 such 
treaties in over 162 countries. This compares with less than 400 at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Ganesan notes that these treaties were popular with developing 
countries because they provided for "national treatment to foreign investors in 
the post-establishment phase only, and do not place any restrictions on host 
countries in following their own FDI policies. This is because the aim of BITs is 
the protection and equitable treatment of FDI after 
the investment has taken place in consonance with the host countries' laws and 
regulations." 
 
The advocates of ECJ make a number of arguments for replacing BITs by 
multilateral treaties which it may be useful to examine. The first is a transactions 




transaction costs involved in a multilateral agreement. This suggestion is 
essentially one of bureaucratic neatness and centralisation, and is not 
convincing. As Hoekman and Saggi (1999) note in their World Bank paper: 
"Regarding the costs imposed by the multitude of BITs on multinational firms, it 
seems that the major proportion of the transactions costs associated with FDI is 
likely to arise from differences in language, culture, politics, and the general 
business climate of a host country. Familiarising oneself with the investment 
laws of a country seems trivial in contrast to these more daunting challenges that 
exist regardless of whether the country is a signatory to a multilateral or a 
bilateral investment agreement." 
 
The second, in some ways related argument made by ECJ enthusiasts, is to 
suggest that a multilateral agreement would provide a more secure framework 
for multinationals and thereby lead to greater FDI than now. This argument has 
already been briefly examined earlier although in a different context, but that 
analysis remains relevant. As was noted, there has been an enormous increase in 
FDI in the 1990s which has evidently occurred under the regime of BITs. 
Investments protection is normally provided in these treaties by provisions for 
private international arbitration. Evidence suggests, however, that this has 
seldom been resorted to with the parties usually settling their disputes prior to 
arbitration. A central point is that investment protection for investors is also 
essentially guaranteed by the fact that there is enormous competition between 
developing countries for FDI and no country would wish to acquire a poor 
reputation with investors. There is nothing to suggest that a multilateral 
agreement would provide more protection which would translate into more 
overall FDI. The main determinants of FDI, a wide range of research suggests, 
are the level of a country's per capita income, its rate of growth, and its physical 
and human capital infrastructure.13 As noted earlier, countries such as China 
and Malaysia have been able to attract enormous amounts of FDI despite their 
comparatively illiberal investment regimes. The protection to investors provided 
by the BITs as well as the reputational concerns of developing countries has 
clearly been regarded as adequate.  
 
One argument in favour of multilateralism which has more validity is that of 
unequal power between advanced countries and some very poor developing 
countries which may lead the latter to having to agree to onerous terms in their 
BITs. The suggestion is that such countries would gain from a multilateral treaty 
where they would collectively have more influence. This, however, presupposes 
that a multilateral treaty on investment which is finally negotiated would be 
development friendly. If it is not, and there can not be any assurance that such a 




countries would be better off with the BITs notwithstanding their shortcomings, 




Very briefly, the central conclusion which follows from the analysis of this 
paper is that ECJ, despite its important concession of confining itself to only one 
source of external finance namely FDI, is a flawed proposal both from the 
perspective of developing and developed countries. Its shortcomings are 
particularly serious with respect to developing countries as it essentially ignores 
the developmental dimension altogether. Developing countries would be better 
off with their existing bilateral treaties (BITs) than with a multilateral agreement 
of the kind represented by ECJ. The paper has, however, emphasized that 
although the current post-Uruguay Round FDI regime is to be preferred in 
relation to the ECJ, the former has, nevertheless severe deficits from a 
developmental perspective which need prompt attention and rectification by the 




1 This paper is based on the authors previous papers on the subject, Singh and 
Zammit, 1999; Singh 2001, 2003, particularly on Singh 2001. 
2 Jagdish Bhagwati (1998) forcefully argues this view in relation to capital 
account liberalisation and suggests that such liberalisation only benefits 
financial interests on Wall Street and officials of the U.S. Treasury.  
3 For recent influential contributions to the subject, see Fischer 2003; Stiglitz 
2004; Summers 2000. 
4 See further Amsden & Singh 1994. 
5  See Chang (1994). 
6 Johnson et al 1989. 
7 See further Yoo and Chang (1992). 
8 This is the empirical definition of FDI adopted by many countries to 
distinguish it from portfolio flows. 
9 Claessens et al (1993), p26. 
10 This point is discussed further below. 
11 This section is in part based on Singh and Dhumale (1999). For previous 
merger waves in the U.S. and U.K., see Golbe and White (1998); Hughes and 
Singh (1980). 10 See Singh (1971, 1975); Schwarz (1982); Cosh , Hughes, Lee 






12 For a comprehensive discussion of the economies of scale and of scope, and 
of multiplant economies of scale, see Scherer and Ross (1990). 
13 See further Amsden,(1989) and Singh (1995a) 
14 For a recent review see Burke and Epstein (2000). 
15 See further Singh (1995b, 1977, 1999b); Singh and Zammit (2000, 2004). 
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TABLE 1: NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970 TO 1998. 
(US$ billions) 
  
  1970  1980  1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Net flow of long-term debt (excl. 
IMF)
1 
6.9 65.2  43.4  77.0  87.6  118.7  82.9 
Foreign direct investment (net)  2.2  4.4  24.5  95.5  119.0  163.4  155.0 
Portfolio equity flows  0.0  0.0  3.7  32.1  45.8  30.2  14.1 
Grants (excl. technical cooperation)  2.2  13.2  29.2  32.6  29.2  25.7  23.0 
Total net resource flows  11.3  82.8  100.8  237.2  281.6  338.0  275.0 
 
1 Bank loans, bonds, official (bilateral and multilateral) loans. 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999; data for 1995 is from Global 






TABLE 2: NET PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL CAPITAL FLOWS: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1984–1989, 1990–1996 
(US$ billions, annual averages) 
 
 1984–1989  1990–1996 
Net private capital flows
1   17.8  129.4 
Net direct investment  12.2  57.9 
Net portfolio investment  4.9  51.1 
Other net investment  0.6  20.4 
Net official flows  27.2  16.8 
Change in reserves2   5.1  –54.8 
 
1 Because of data limitations, “other net investment” may include some official flows. 
2 A minus sign indicates an increase. 
 

















  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002e  2003f 
Current account  
      balance  
-91.4  -113.6  -10.7  61.9 27.6 48.3 26.2 
as % GDP  -1.5  -2.0  -0.2  1.0  0.5  0.8  0.4 
Financed by:         
Net equity flows 
 
196.4 181.9 194.3 186.7 177.6 152.3 158.0 
Net FDI inflows 
 
169.3 174.5 179.3 160.6 171.7 143.0 145.0 
Net portfolio equity 
inflows 
26.7  7.4 15.0  26.0  6.0 9.4 13.0 
Net debt flows  102.1  57.4  13.9  -1.0  3.2  7.2  5.0 
Note:   e = estimate;  f = forecast 
 
Source: World Bank Global Development Finance 2003, Analysis and Statistical Appendix, 






















TABLE 4: DEVELOPING COUNTRY FLOWS OF FDI, CAPITAL MARKET FLOWS, 
OUTPUT AND TRADE AS PERCENTAGES OF GLOBAL TOTALS, 1991-2000. 
 
 




9.7 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.8 10.8  6.2 4.7 5.5 
In global FDI 
flows 
22.3 27.4 29.5 35.2 32.3 34.9 36.5 25.9 18.9 15.9 
In global 
output 
19.8 19.2 19.7 20.0 20.7 22.1 23.2 21.6 21.7 22.5 
In global 
trade 
26.5 28.3 28.3 28.4 29.5 31.3 32.4 30.7 30.7 33.4 
 





TABLE 5: INWARD FDI FLOWS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL 
FORMATION DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1988-1998. (Percentage) 
 
 
  Developed countries  Developing countries 
1988-1993 (Annual Average) 4.0  4.6 
1994 3.5  8.3 
1995 4.5  7.6 
1996 4.8  9.1 
1997 6.2  10.8 
1998 10.9  11.5 
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and 















TABLE 6: CROSS-BORDER M&AS: SALES AND PURCHASES, 
BY REGION, 1990-1999 (US$ billions) 
 
  Sales Purchases 
Region/ 
economy 
1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 
Developed 
countries 
134.2  164.6  234.7  445.1  644.6  143.2  173.7  272.0  
 




62.1  75.1  114.6 187.9 344.5 86.5  81.4  142.1 284.4 497.7 
United 
States 
54.7 53.2 81.7 209.5  233.0  27.6 57.3 80.9 137.4  112.4 
Japan  0.1 0.5 3.1 4.0 15.9  14.0  3.9 2.7 1.3 9.8 
Developing 
Countries 
16.1 15.9 64.3 80.7 63.4 7.0  12.8 32.4 19.2 41.2 
of which: 






11.5 8.6  41.1 63.9 37.2 1.6  4.0  10.7 12.6 24.9 
Europe - - - - 0.3  - - - - - 
Asia  4.1  6.9  21.3 16.1 25.3 5.4  8.8  21.7 6.4  15.9 






0.3 6.0 5.8 5.1 10.3  -  0.1 0.3 1.0 1.6 
World
b  150.6 186.6 304.8 531.6 720.1 150.6 186.6 304.8 531.6 720.1 
 
a includes the countries of the former Yugoslavia. 
b includes amounts that cannot be allocated by region. 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 